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Tax avoidance means the ‘arranging of a taxpayer’s affairs in such a way that his tax liability 
is reduced or he has no obligation to pay tax at all’.1 The harm caused by tax avoidance has the 
potential to harm government programs: for every loophole utilised to reduce tax liability, less 
funds are raised by tax collection and therefore available for the use of these programs. It is 
submitted that tax avoidance is universal. It was done by the Egyptians, the Lords and today 
by taxpayers who wish to minimise their tax liability.2  
 
Tax avoidance is facilitated by vague tax legislation. Courts turn to precedents because the 
legislation is too uncertain. It was held that plain words of the statute must be applied,3 however 
these often give rise to several ambiguities.   
 
There are vast amounts of money which the fiscus is entitled to, but do not receive in the tax 
collection process. This is questioned to be due to either tax avoidance or an ineffective tax 
collection procedure. The study acknowledges that tax evasion is also to blame, however it 
does not delve into this are of tax law. The fiscus must simultaneously balance tax collection 
and avoidance on the one hand, and tax collection and morality on the other hand. The balance 
lies in more effective and efficient administrative action from SARS, including educating 













1 JMP Venter et al 2017: 510-511. 
2 JMP Venter et al 2017: 510-511. 
3 IRC v Duke of Westminster 1936 AC 1 HL:524. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: THE CONTEXT 
 
1.1 Background and Introduction: 
According to the Minister of Finance,4 South Africa’s tax system is based on principles of 
certainty, efficiency and equity.5 The South African Revenue Service Act6 anticipates that the 
tax policy aiming to raise revenue will be done in a manner that is efficient and effective.7 In 
the Strategic Plan of 2015/16-2019/20 the Minister concedes that in order to do this, the tax 
base must be broadened.8 He guarantees this through ensuring taxpayers who are liable will 
fully and timeously meet their legal responsibilities.9 The Legislature however allows for tax 
avoidance, creating an anomalous situation.  
 
Tax avoidance means the ‘arranging of a taxpayer’s affairs in such a way that his tax liability 
is reduced, or he has no obligation to pay tax at all’10. It is critical to note that, unlike tax 
evasion, in certain cases, tax avoidance is a permissible and a legal way of avoiding tax. 11 Tax 
evasion refers ‘to illegal actions intentionally entered into by a taxpayer to absolve himself 
from a tax burden’12. This study will not investigate tax evasion. Nevertheless, a fine line exists 
between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  This is due to the abuse of tax avoidance often resulting 
in tax evasion. Legislation and common law derived from case law are both used to deal with 
tax avoidance, however legislation and the General Anti-avoidance Rules (GAAR) govern tax 
avoidance. Several authors have discussed the transition between the new and old provisions 
and speculated as to the success of it.13 Various cases will be discussed to illustrate how 
taxpayers’ transactions have narrowed the definition of tax avoidance and what may be utilised 
to reducing legal obligations.14  
 
 
4 Minister NM Nene. 
5 SARS Strategic Plan 2015/16 - 2019/20 (2015) 4.  
6 Act 34/1997. 
7 Act 34/1997: sec4(2). 
8 SARS Strategic Plan 2015/16 - 2019/20 (2015) 4.  
9 Ibid 8. 
10JMP Venter et al 2017: 510-511. 
11JMP Venter et al 2017: 510. 
12 Ibid 11. 
13DJ Benn Tax Avoidance in South Africa: An analysis of general anti-avoidance rules in terms of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended and Dlamini 2011 Analysis of Tax Avoidance Legislation in South Africa: 
Developments Over a Five-Year Period. 
14Such as Smith v CIR 1964 (1) SA 324 (A); 26 SATC 1 and CIR v Challenge Corp Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 513. 
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This research will investigate whether the tax avoidance used by taxpayers damages the fiscus 
by virtue of ineffective tax collection.  This tax collection is mainly sustained by Personal 
Income Tax (‘PIT’), which increased by R36.6 billion from 2007/08 to 2016/2016. 15 ‘As a 
percentage of total tax revenue, PIT increased from 29.6% in 2007/08 to 37.2% in 2016/17‘.16   
SARS collected R8.13 trillion total revenue for the fiscal years from 2007/08 to 2016/17.17 Tax 
revenue collected in the 2017 tax year amounted to R1 144.1 billion.18 It is well established 
that PIT is one of the three main tax instruments which together are responsible for more than 
80% of the revenue.19 By allowing taxpayers the freedom to manage their affairs, the fiscus is 
at risk of reducing one of its main sources of revenue. The exemptions contained in section 
1020 provide for a list of receipts and accruals exempt from normal tax.21 Deductions based on 
section 1122 deliver another range of possible amounts that can legally be deducted from the 
income of the taxpayer. Capital allowances also provide a scope of deductions for various 
trades. Taxpayers merely need to interpret their affairs to fall within the ambit of these 
legislative provisions to reduce their taxable income, which in turn will minimise the amount 
collected by the fiscus. This is one simple way in which tax avoidance will affect PIT.  The 
problem the fiscus faces is that it must balance allowing taxpayers the freedom to manage their 
affairs while simultaneously ensuring that the main source of tax collection is not threatened. 
This study aims to evaluate whether this balance is possible.     
 
The definition of tax avoidance has been discussed in great depth by various scholars and in 
judgments: Smith v CIR23 discussed the ordinary meaning of avoiding liability as to prevent or 
escape an anticipated liability. CIR v Challenge Corp Ltd24 took the previous judgments further. 
Tax avoidance relates to more than stated in Smith because a taxpayer involved in tax avoidance 
obtains an advantage by reducing his income.  The previous research sheds light on various 
interpretations of tax avoidance in order to comprehend the full extent of it. The present 
research aims to investigate more than the definition of avoidance, but will focus on the harm 
 
15 SARS 2017 Statistics (2017) 5. 
16 Ibid 15. 
17 Ibid 15. 
18 Ibid 15.  
19 This study will not investigate the effect of tax avoidance on the other main instruments, namely corporate 
income tax and VAT, but the principles of effective and efficient tax collection applies to all. 
20 Act 58/62. 
21 Act 58/62. 
22 Act 58/62. 
23 1964 (1) SA 324 (A); 26 SATC 1. 
24[1986] 2 NZLR 513. 
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it may cause in South Africa, and whether it is possible to strike a balance between allowing a 
degree of tax avoidance while at the same time protecting the interests of the fiscus.  
 
The harm that could be caused by tax avoidance has not been investigated as SARS does not 
measure the impact of tax avoidance in its statistics, so effectively one has to turn elsewhere to 
gauge the harm. As the government’s largest source of income, the tax revenue collected funds 
improvements in health, education and other government programs every year.25 The possible 
harm caused by tax avoidance will consequently harm these government programs: for every 
loophole utilised to reduce tax liability, less funds are raised by tax collection and therefore 
available for the use of these programs. A counter argument could be made that tax avoidance 
is legal but Treasury has implemented a range of anti-avoidance measures indicating that tax 
avoidance is not welcome, despite being legal.26 It is submitted that if SARS and the Legislature 
continue to develop more anti-avoidance measures in order to stay abreast of the new tax 
avoidance schemes created, more revenue will possibly be collected and the government 
programs will improve.  
 
1.2 Research Goals: 
One of the goals of this research is to show what tax avoidance is and how it is used to limit a 
taxpayer’s liability. The research also aims to explore the applicability of the historical case 
law on which the allowance for tax avoidance is based. A potential outcome of the study is that 
tax avoidance will need to be limited more than what it already is, by possibly adding more 
anti-avoidance measures. It is conceded that the limitation of avoidance borders on referring to 
tax evasion. Tax evasion refers to illegal methods used to create or move accruals that fall 
outside the Act27, which means no tax liability is created.28 This research will not examine tax 
evasion.  Another potential outcome of the study is that tax avoidance could be balanced within 
the realms of efficient and effective tax collection by improving tax compliance or the tax 
collection process. The words ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ will be investigated in great depth. 
Their ordinary meaning is to ‘achieve maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or 
 
25 Kumarasingam ‘Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion explained and exemplified’ (2010) SATax Guide available 
at <http://www.sataxguide.co.za/tax-avoidance-and-tax-evasion-explained-and-exemplified/>, accessed on 
28/02/2018. 
26 Act 58/1962: sec80A-L. 
27 Act 58/1962. 
28 JMP Venter et al 2017: 512. 
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expense’29 and ‘being successful in producing a desired result’30. An attempt will be made to 
find the balance, which will consequently allow taxpayers more freedom to arrange their 
affairs. This study is accordingly critical of the allowance of tax avoidance. The study asserts 
that tax avoidance is based on uncertainties created by tax legislation and its ever-changing 
nature. Lack of defined principles and reliance on case law to set the parameters contribute to 
the uncertainty. However, SARS relies on the changing nature of the legislation to combat the 
loss of revenue, with an annual Budget Speech and legislative changes.   
 
1.3 Research Methodology: 
The research for this dissertation is desk-top based. The dissertation will use a range of sources 
such as journal articles, legislation, textbooks and case law. The findings are mainly based on 
case law and the way the courts have in the past evaluated their decisions and reasons for the 
way they reached their conclusions. The findings reached at the end are in no way conclusive 
and are a matter of opinion reached from conducting this research. 
 
1.4 Study Outline: 
The next chapter investigates the definition of tax avoidance by analysing case law. Some 
case law ‘assists’ the legislation by aiding in its interpretation, the other ‘supplements’ the 
legislation by providing common law tests applicable to tax avoidance, such as substance 
over form which assists the legislation. The assistance needed is attributed to the legislation’s 
vagueness and lack of defined principles, creating uncertainty. The language used in 
legislation is questioned as it is this uncertainty created that forms the base of tax avoidance. 
The chapter will also critically examine the applicability of the leading tax avoidance case, 
questioning whether its principles are still relevant in the modern economy and legal system. 
The application of the substance over form principle will be analysed and discussed.  
 
Having established what tax avoidance is, chapter 3 analyses the harm caused by tax 
avoidance to the fiscus by relying on various statistics and journals. Case law is also referred 
to, to illustrate the amount of revenue that would not have been collected had the taxpayers 
 
29 Merriam Webster 2018. ‘Efficient’ available at <https://www merriam-webster.com/dictionary/efficient>, 
accessed on 20/06/18. 
30 Merriam Webster 2018. ‘Effective’ available at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effective> 
accessed on 20/06/18. 
5 
 
not been personally investigated or audited.  
Chapter 4 critically investigates the words ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ in order to establish what 
to expect from efficient and effective tax collection. The perimeters of the tax collection 
process have to be identified in order to investigate whether the process followed by SARS is 
effective and efficient. Tax compliance is a big part of tax collection, whereof tax morality 
plays a role. Tax morality must be balanced within the equation of avoidance versus 
collection. The chapter will also question the productivity and success of SARS over the 
years. 
 
After both tax avoidance and tax collection have been discussed, chapter 5 explores the 
difference between permissible and impermissible tax avoidance. GAARs are investigated as 
a possible solution and their efficiency is discussed. This chapter attempts to find the balance 
between damaging tax avoidance and effective and efficient tax collection. The difference 
between permissible and impermissible tax avoidance is explored as a possible solution to the 
study’s problem.  
 
Finally, chapter 6 seeks to bring the discussion to a conclusion by recapping the previous 


























2 CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
By continually paying attention to transactions entered into throughout the tax year, taxpayers 
can plan their tax affairs. 31  
Tax avoidance is an example of tax planning.32 Avoidance means to arrange a taxpayer’s affairs 
by legal means in such a way that his tax liability is reduced or he has no taxable income on 
which to pay tax at all, 33 whilst evasion refers to illegal actions intentionally entered into by a 
taxpayer to absolve himself from a tax burden.34 The most important difference is that one is 
deemed illegal, the other not.35  
This chapter aims to show what tax avoidance is and how it has been fleshed out by referring 
to various judgments. It was submitted in the previous chapter that case law needs to 
supplement our legislation due to undefined principles and the wide possibilities of 
interpretation created thereby. It is argued that due to this ambiguous situation created, tax 
avoidance arises from the freedom taxpayers are given. The universality of tax avoidance will 
also be tested. This will be done by investigating IRC v Minster van Duke36 and Commissioner 
for South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd37 to determine whether the founding principles 
of tax avoidance from 1936 could still be applicable to modern day tax legislation.  
 
For the last 5000 years, individuals i.e. taxpayers have been endeavouring to avoid tax.38 Tax 
avoidance is a global occurrence, with some countries disallowing it and others abusing the 
system.39 An example of a country disallowing tax avoidance would be the United States of 
America. 40  This principle dates back to the late 1930’s when the Treasury Secretary H. 
Morgenthau characterized the wealthy individuals’ purchase of tax-exempt bonds as ‘moral 
 
31 ‘Tax Planning’ (2014) Tax Consulting South Africa available at <http://www.taxconsulting.co.za/tax-planning 
accessed on 4/4/2017. 
32 C Theron Critically consider the key differences between the concepts of tax planning, tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. A brief consideration of the significance of the concepts to lawyers (unpublished LLB thesis, 
University of Free State, 2017) 4. 
33 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) (606/97) [1999] ZASCA 
64 (17 September 1999). 
34 Izak Jacobus Nel Engelbrecht v S (44/10) [2011] ZASCA 068 (17 May 2011). 
35 C Theron (note 32 above) 4. 
36 (1936) AC 1 HL. 
37 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd [2011] 2 All SA 347 SCA. 
38 Theron (note 32 above) 4. 
39 Blankson A Brief History of Taxation (2007) 3-25. 
40 Blankson A Brief History of Taxation (2007) 6. 
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fraud’.41 However, the war against tax avoidance was lost when President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt in addressing his Message to Congress in 1937, blurred the line between avoidance 
and evasion because ‘the decency of American morals is involved’.42   
 
An example must also be given of a country abusing the tax system. Samual Blankson describes 
this in his book A Brief History of Taxation:43 In 167 BC after the Roman Empire conquered 
Macedonia, the tax revenue base included mines and residents of the 4 new Roman client 
republics in Macedonia. Local magistrates were responsible for collecting taxes, who in turn 
employed tax farmers to do so. The tax collection for a particular region was put to tender, and 
tax farmers would offer their services to advance the expected annual tax. This would take the 
form of a loan earning interest. The interest was repayable to the tax farmer upon settlement of 
the contract. The excess collected would be awarded to the tax farmer. Despite this system 
being very lucrative for the tax farmers and the Empire, the corruption and abuse caused some 
provincials to be in debt with growing tax debts. The system was abolished, and the sole ruler 
replaced the system with a 1% Wealth Tax and a flat rate Poll Tax for all adults which required 
regular census taking. Again, the country abused the tax system; it allowed many individuals 
to avoid paying their taxes because the census information was out of date. Therefore, the 
wealth of the citizens often exceeded that which determined their taxes due.    
 
The first tax evasion and avoidance principles were first found in Egypt, 3000 BC.44 Livestock, 
cooking oil, grain, personal livelihood and transportation on the Nile River were taxed by the 
Ancient Egyptians.45 Sanctions for failing to declare income or fraudulent declarations 
included death or flogging.46 This tax system had no exemptions and all classes of society were 
liable to pay; including rich nobles and tax collectors.47 In order to limit their tax liability, 
citizens would make use of substituted oil, instead of the oil being taxed.48. As an anti-
avoidance measure Scribes audited each household’s cooking oil consumption, in order to 
 
41 Blankson A Brief History of Taxation (2007) 6. 
42 Bank quoted from Tax Laws and Morals, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1937, at 4. (quoting Pres. Roosevelt).  
43 Blankson A Brief History of Taxation (2007) 17-19. 
44 Ibid 43. 
45 Ibid 43. 
46 Ibid 43. 
47 Ibid 43. 




guarantee the use of taxed oil.49 The Egyptians were possibly the first taxpayers to avoid tax.50  
 
The precedent setting English law case wherein the court considered ‘tax avoidance‘ is IRC v 
Duke of Westminster. Lord Tomlin stated:51  
Every man is entitled if he can to arrange his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 
secure that result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. 
 
This case is relevant because South African law is directly impacted by the English Law 
influence in our Roman-Dutch Law. This Chapter will question whether the principles applied 
should still be relevant a millennium later, as this will show that tax avoidance is universal and 
despite the many economic changes from 1936 until 2019, tax avoidance could still be allowed 
on the same basis.   
 
A more recent South African case referring to ‘tax avoidance‘ is Commissioner for South 
African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd:52: 
It is trite that a taxpayer may organize his financial affairs in such a way as to pay the least tax 
permissible. There is, in principle, nothing wrong with arrangements that are tax effective. But 
there is something wrong with dressing up or disguising a transaction to make it appear to be 
something that it is not, especially if that has the purpose of tax evasion, or the avoidance of a 
peremptory rule of law.  
 
The main legislation used to deal with tax avoidance is the general anti-tax avoidance measures. 
Section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act53 governed these measures for a number of years but 
was subsequently replaced by sections 80A-L - the new provisions governing impermissible 
avoidance arrangements. ‘Section 103 had too many inherent weaknesses, which lead to 
taxpayers abusing the system set in place by SARS.’54 A taxpayer will organize his financial 
affairs by using the loopholes provided by legislation.  A factor contributing to the existence 
of the loopholes or grey areas would be the language used in legislation. The result of the 
uncertain language is that case law must be utilised to identify transgressions. The problems 
 
49 Blankson A Brief History of Taxation (2007) 4. 
50 Ibid 49. 
51 IRC v Duke of Westminster 1936 AC 1 HL:41. 
52 NWK supra note 37 at 42. 
53 Act 58/1962. 
54 Van Zyl 2016: 812. 
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with the language-element must be identified and addressed. 
2.2 Language 
Lord Russell held that taxation cases must be decided according to the plain words of the statute 
applicable to the circumstances and facts of the case.55 It is submitted that the language used in 
the tax legislation contributes to the existence of the loopholes or grey areas which leads to 
cases such as Duke of Westminster discussed below.  
Judge Hand said:56 
In my own case the words of such an Act as the Income Tax, for example, dance merely before 
my eyes in meaningless procession: cross-reference, exceptions upon exception - couched in 
abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of - leave in my mind only a confused sense of 
some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which is within my power if at all, 
only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters are the result of 
fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, against all 
possible evasion; yet at all times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about certain 
passages of Hegel: That they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one 
cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are 
strung together with syntactical correctness. 
 
Terms such as ‘Received By’, ‘Accrued To’, ‘Capital’ and ‘Revenue’ are not defined by the 
Act57, yet they form part of the crucial definition of Gross Income. These terms are all further 
defined or explained by case law. However, difficulties remain and the application of these 
terms is still not clear as each case has to be investigated and decided on the specific facts. It 
is submitted that these broader definitions provided by cases are not necessarily applicable to 
each case to be decided.  
 
Another example is Section 11(d),58 the operation of which hinges on the crucial term 
‘Repairs’, yet the section contains no definition of the term. This gives rise to uncertainty about 
whether expenditure will qualify as ‘Repairs’ or whether it constitutes expenditure on 
‘Improvements’, which are not claimable under the section. Although case law has set out 
various tests to determine whether the expenditure falls within this section’s ambit, there is still 
 
55 Westminster supra note 51 at 524. 
56 A Cox 'Judge Learned Hand and Interpretation of Statutes (1946 - 1947) 60 Harvard Law Review 370 at 389 - 
90'. 
57 Act 58/1962. 
58 Act 58/1962. 
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an element of ambiguity for every case.  
One such test entails differentiating between restoring subsidiary parts of a whole, versus 
reconstructing an entirety. 59 This includes substantially the whole subject and is not necessarily 
only the whole under discussion.60 Rhodesia Railways Ltd v Income Tax Collector, 
Bechuanaland61 had to distinguish between ‘subsidiary parts’ and the ‘entirety’. ‘Railways 
replaced rails and sleepers on 33 miles of a railway line’.62 The railway’s total length was 394 
miles.63 Had all 394 miles been replaced, it would definitely constitute an ‘entirety’, the court 
held that 33 miles of the 394 constituted a ‘subsidiary part’.64 However, it further went to state 
that:65 
 The contrast between the cost of relaying the line so as to restore it to its original condition and 
the cost of relaying the line so as to improve it is well brought out in the passage just quoted, 
and while the former is recognised as a legitimate charge against income, the extra cost incurred 
in the latter case in the improvement of the line is equally recognised as a proper charge against 
capital. In the present instance the renewals effected constituted no improvement; they merely 
made good the line so as to restore it to its original state. 
 
Despite the elements of capital in nature or income also included considerations, repair is 
inevitably an improvement on the asset being repaired. CIR v African Products Manufacturing 
Co Ltd66 stated that ‘Repair is restoration by renewal or replacement of subsidiary parts of a 
whole’.67 
These cases cannot be used as confirmatory blanket tests to determine whether it was a renewal 
or repair. Notwithstanding that SARS published an Interpretation Note68 to shed light on this 
uncertainty, it merely affirms that there are no set determined rules that can be provided for the 
distinction and each case will have to be decided on its own facts.  
  
The terms ‘Machinery’ or ‘Plant’ are also frequently used throughout the Act69 and are key 
concepts in the sections in which they are used, but yet again there is no statutory definition.  
 
59 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474. 
60 ITC 617 (1946) 14 SATC 474. 
61 Rhodesia Railways Ltd v Income Tax Collector, Bechuanaland (1933) 6 SATC 225. 
62 Ibid 61. 
63 Ibid 61. 
64 Ibid 61. 
65 Ibid 61. 
66 1994 TPD 248 (13 SATC 164). 
67 CIR v African Products Manufacturing Co Ltd 1994 TPD 248 (13 SATC 164) at 169. 
68 SARS. Interpretation Note No: 74 Deduction and Recoupment of Expenditure Incurred on Repairs. (2015) 1. 
69 Act 58/1962: section 8; 11; 12B; 12C; 12E; 23A. 
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Judgments include references to the Oxford Dictionary, but again, each case’s facts are 
different and must be treated as such. A taxpayer’s ability to mould his transactions so that it 
falls within these terms, and thus qualifies for a deduction or an allowance, is what gives rise 
to tax avoidance. If taxpayers are able to do this the revenue due to the fiscus is reduced.  
Section 2670 provides that ‘persons carrying on pastoral, agricultural or other farming 
operations‘ shall determine their taxable income differently than normal taxpayers. These 
taxpayers qualify for certain special deductions and capital allowances, which are found in the 
First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, as well as in section 12B and section 12C. However, 
‘Farming Operations’ is not defined, leading to another grey area. Once again it is left to case 
law to provide a measure of certainty.71  
 
Passive income is another concept that is not defined. The Katz Commission has considered 
defining this concept separately or providing a definition of active income.72 Thus anything 
that is excluded from the ‘Active Income’ definition will automatically be ‘Passive Income’. 
 
Law must be clear and certain.  With certain key words in tax legislation undefined and left to 
the courts to determine, the law will never be clear nor certain.  
When drafting statutes, the legislator is expected to cover every possibility with precision. This 
impossible task creates the grey areas which enable taxpayers to arrange their tax affairs. Often 
terms are used inadequately in a statute to describe what the Legislature intended.73 This leads 
to confusion, ambiguity and consequently, uncertainty.74 It is submitted that uncertainty 
provides taxpayers the opportunity to fall within the intended sections of the Act75 and qualify 
for deductions, exemptions or capital allowances which were not intended to apply to their 
situation, and which would not have been applicable to them, had the terms been narrowly 
defined.  
 
If hypothetically, the tax legislation were to be made more certain and all-encompassing 
definitions published, innovative and complex agreements will be entered into by taxpayers to 
 
70 Act 58/1962. 
71 R Koster & Son v CIR 1985 (2) SA 831 (A), 47 SATC 23. 
72 South African Treasury Basing the South African Income Tax System on the Source or Residence Principle-
Options and Recommendations 21-22. 
73 G Goldswain. Hanged by a Comma, Groping in the Dark and Holy Cows – Fingerprinting the Judicial Aids 
used in the Interpretation of Statutes. (2011) 30-56. 
74 Ibid 55.  
75 Act 58/1962. 
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fall out of the definitions.76 ‘Thus it is accepted that tax legislation cannot foresee every 
possible circumstance or scheme that will arise.77 It is stated that no country has succeeded in 
doing so and the ability to find precise wording is also not available to even the best 
Legislature.’78 
It is not this study’s aim to provide solutions to these undefined concepts. These are merely 
examples of where the tax legislation is not certain, creating opportunities for tax avoidance. 
Words are by nature capable of having multiple meanings.79 Although the meaning of the 
words depend on the Legislature’s intention when drafting the statute, guidance will be sought 
from the tax courts when judgments are handed down. It is submitted that this does not add 
certainty or clarity as the subjectivity of the judges makes this guidance unreliable to a certain 
extent. This scepticism is supported by Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners80 were it was held that judges ought to ‘look at what is clearly said. There is 
no room for any intendment. There is no equity about tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. 
Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.’ 81 
When scrutinizing legislation, judges are expected to merely look at the language used. 82  
However, should a tax avoidance scheme come under scrutiny of a judge, they are expected to 
investigate the intendment. Contrary to when looking at legislation, Substance over Form must 
be considered when taking into account words used in avoidance schemes. It must be kept in 
mind that there are both statutory ant-avoidance measures as well as common law i.e. substance 
over form. The substance over form principle is discussed below.  
 
2.3.1 IRC v Duke of Westminster 1936 AC 1 HL  
This case was decided in 1936 and set a precedent that has been cited in almost every 
subsequent avoidance case.  
 
 
76 Theron (note 32 above) 25. 
77 SARS ‘Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance Section 103 of Income Tax Act’ available at 
<http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/DiscPapers/LAPD-LPrep-DP-2005-01%20-
%20Discussion%20Paper%20Tax%20Avoidance%20Section%20103%20of%20Income%20Tax%20Act%2019
62.pdf.>, accessed on 04/04/2017. 
78 Theron (note 32 above; 25). 
79 TLC Maliti. An Analysis of the Approach of the Courts in Determining the capital or revenue nature of 
Income and Expenditure. (2002) 2-3. 
80 Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 KB 64: 71. 
81 Ibid 80. 




The Duke entered into a Deed of Covenant with his employees. 83 Although it is held that the 
deeds were not identical, they were all similar. 84 They stated that in recognising the services 
rendered faithfully to the Duke over the years, the Duke wished to make provision for them 
notwithstanding that they ‘may re-engage or continue in the Appellant's service in which event 
they will become entitled to remuneration in respect of such future service’.85 In consideration 
of the employees’ past services the Duke contracted to pay them during the joint lives of 
himself and them or for a weekly sum for a period of years.86 Admittedly, under the deed all 
the employees were paid out the quantities which they would have received as salary or wages 
if they survived the period plus continued their service.87 However, if they terminated the 
employment, the payments were still secured by the deed.88  
 
According to the legislation at the time, all payments made under a deed would be allowed as 
a deduction from the income.89 The Duke was liable for Super-tax and these payments ought 
to have been deducted, consequently minimising his tax liability. 90 The Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue held that all payments under the separate deeds entered into with employees 
still in his service, were expenditures for services to be rendered, thus not allowable as 
deductions.91 If the employees were not in the Duke’s service anymore, these payments under 
the deed could be a proper deduction.92 The Duke appealed this decision and brought the matter 
before 9 High Court judges.93   
 
2.3.1.2 Judgment by appeal court: 
Minority Judgment: 
The three judges held that the deeds were not part of a device or strategy entered into to avoid 
the tax liabilities the Income Tax Acts imposed.94 It was not contested that the recipients were 
 
83 Westminster supra note 51 at 5. 
84 Westminster supra note 51 at 5. 
85 Westminster supra note 51 at 5. 
86 Westminster supra note 51 at 5. 
87 Westminster supra note 51 at 6. 
88 Westminster supra note 51 at 6. 
89 Westminster supra note 51 at 9. 
90 Westminster supra note 51 at 9. 
91 Westminster supra note 51 at 10. 
92 Westminster supra note 51 at 10. 
93 Westminster supra note 51 at 10. 
94 Westminster supra note 51 at 502. 
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ordinarily entitled to their remuneration as they had over a period rendered services to the 
Duke.95 These payments would be an allowable deduction in terms of the Duke’s Super-tax 
liabilities.96  
The Judge in the court a quo said that ‘Looking, not at the form, but at the substance, of a thing, 
this must be regarded, in the case of the servants remaining in His Grace’s employ, as wages.’97 
The minority did not agree with this stating that it was dangerous to use the word ‘substance’ 
loosely98 and that by regarding the substance, not the form, and arriving at the conclusion that 
the sums are provided as remuneration, the judges are impermissibly re-writing contracts 
between parties.99  It was acknowledged that the real nature of the transaction must be looked 
at.100 The nature of the transaction may be analysed and this must include the surrounding 
circumstances of both the payee and the payer.101 When examining the whole of the substance, 




The majority however dismissed the appeal. They held that as long as the servants remain in 
the Duke’s service, the payment will be for the services they render.103 Once they retire or leave 
the Duke’s employment it becomes a different matter because then the payment will not be for 
services rendered.104 
 
Lord Tomlin dealt specifically with the substance-principle:105 
It is said that in Revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may ignore the legal position 
and regard what is called ‘the substance of the matter’ and that here the substance of the matter 
is that the annuitant was serving the Duke for something equal to his former salary or wages 
and that, therefore, while he is so serving, the annuity must be treated as salary or wages. This 
supposed doctrine (upon which the Commissioners apparently acted) seems to rest for its 
 
95 Westminster supra note 51 at 503. 
96 Westminster supra note 51 at 503. 
97 Westminster supra note 51 at 507. 
98 Westminster supra note 51 at 507. 
99 Westminster supra note 51 at 509. 
100 Westminster supra note 51 at 507. 
101Westminster supra note 51 at 507. 
102Westminster supra note 51 at 507. 
103Westminster supra note 51 at 500. 
104Westminster supra note 51 at 500. 
105Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
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support upon a misunderstanding of language used in some earlier cases. The sooner this 
misunderstanding is dispelled and the supposed doctrine given its quietus the better it will be 
for all concerned, for the doctrine seems to involve substituting ‘the uncertain and crooked cord 
of discretion’ for ‘the golden and straight mete wand of the law’. 
 
He stated that: ‘Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under 
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.’106 This statement gave rise to tax 
avoidance. If the taxpayer is successful it must be allowed, regardless of the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue. 107  Contrary to his final judgment, Lord Tomlin considered the doctrine of 
substance as a forceful manner to order all taxpayers to pay tax which is not legally 
claimable.108 It is permissible to do so when the documents were not bona fide and merely 
served as a veil, however this was not suggested in the Duke’s case.109 He erroneously held 
that the deeds were given their proper legal operation because they were not used to conceal 
another transaction.110  Accordingly, he did not look at the substance of the matter.111 
He submitted that by investigating the substance of a matter, the true legal position is 
overlooked and another legal right or liability takes the place of what is agreed upon by the 
parties.112 He believed that taxation cases must be taxed according to the plain words of the 
statute applicable to the circumstances and facts of the case, not according to what the Court 
viewed the substance of the transaction was.113  
 
2.3.1.3 Conclusion: 
Both majority and minority found that the money was paid under the deeds. The minority 
reached their conclusion by noting that the legal document cannot be seen differently whether 
the recipients are employed or not. The nature of the document is to be consistent. The real 
nature of the transaction must be examined as a whole and both substance and form must be 
regarded. It is submitted that the majority did not apply this principle as the letters complicated 
the matter. The legal effect of the standing contract was also not determined by the majority, 
who instead determined what the legal effect might be were the words of the deed disregarded.  
 
106Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
107 Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
108 Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
109 Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
110 Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
111 Westminster supra note 51 at 521. 
112 Westminster supra note 51 at 522. 
113 Westminster supra note 51 at 524. 
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The majority did not consider the substance of the transaction, stating that support for this 
doctrine is because of a misunderstanding of the language used in prior cases. By allowing this 
application they would disregard the true legal position. The majority preferred to use the 
wording of legislation only.   
 
It is submitted that the majority judgment was erroneous. Had this case been decided in 2019 
the common law principle ‘substance over form’ would be applied as the minority did.  
The general principle is that our court gives effect to the real transaction if the results were 
intended. A more recent case to demonstrate the application of the ‘Substance over Form’ 
principle is Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v NWK.114 This case will be 
discussed to illustrate how the courts follow the minority judgment in Westminster. 
 
2.3.2 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd [2012] 2 All SA 347 SCA 
2.3.2.1 Facts: 
In this case: 
The Supreme Court of Appeal included the legal doctrine of substance over form in the 
interpretation of the law.115 The taxpayer obtained a loan from Slab Trading Company, which 
is a subsidiary of FNB.116 The taxpayer had to deliver maize after 5 years, in order to repay the 
capital sum.117 Interest on the loan was payable every 6 months.118 The interest was payable by 
issuing promissory notes.119 The same maize the taxpayer would have would have used to 
reimburse Slab, was sold to the taxpayer by FNB, as a result of all the complex agreements 
entered into.120 The taxpayer subtracted the interest payments made in terms of S11(a) for the 
1999-2003 years of assessment.121 SARS argued that both capital and interest payments were 
included in the promissory notes and that the actual loan given to the taxpayer was R50 
million.122 The notes that related to the settlement of capital was therefore not allowed as 
expenditure actually incurred in the production of the income.123 The court had to decide 
whether ‘simulated transactions’ were entered into regarding the loan agreement and the 
 
114 NWK supra note 37. 
115 NWK supra note 37 at 1. 
116 NWK supra note 37 at 1. 
117 NWK supra note 37 at 8. 
118 NWK supra note 37 at 11. 
119 NWK supra note 37 at 11. 
120 NWK supra note 37 at 12. 
121 NWK supra note 37 at 24. 
122 NWK supra note 37 at 32. 
123 NWK supra note 37 at 32. 
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forward sales and cessions between the parties.124 Alternatively, the court had to consider 
whether the transaction constituted a ‘transaction, operation or scheme’ without commercial 
substance in terms of section 103(1), now replaced by sections 80A to 80L.125    
2.3.2.2 Judgment by appeal court: 
When the NWK matter was appealed, it was confirmed that the principle of entering into tax-
effective arrangements was valid.126 However the court found fault with disguising a transaction 
if the purpose thereof was to avoid or evade tax.127 It was held that the transaction lacked 
commercial substance and therefore the anti-avoidance section could be applied.128  
SARS’s capability to attack transactions in terms of the substance over form doctrine was 
amplified by the NWK judgment.129 The common law protects the fiscus to the extent that courts 
will break the transaction down and uncover the true nature and substance of the contract.130 It 
will disregard what was specifically set out in writing.’131 In order to accomplish this, SARS 
must prove that the parties had132 ‘… a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs 
from the simulated intention.133  
 
2.3.3 Interpretive assistance offered by case law 
When comparing the Duke of Westminster case with the NWK case, certain similarities appear 
because both cases dealt with transactions that possibly lacked commercial substance. In both 
instances the taxpayer entered into exorbitant transactions to achieve simple outcomes which 
limited their tax liability.  
Despite the Legislature’s new addition to the tax avoidance battle134, most cases are decided 
by making use of the common law provision of ‘substance over form’. It was also this provision 
 
124 NWK supra note 37 at 33. 
125 Theron (note 32 above). 
126 NWK supra note 37 at 42. 
127 NWK supra note 37 at 42. 
128 NWK supra note 37 at 92. 
129 Dachs and Du Plessis ‘CSARS v NWK’ (17 February 2011) available at 
<https://www.ensafrica.com/newsletter/briefs/14_02_11%2001%2001lr1402law_al_2.pdf>, accessed on 
26/08/2017.  
130 SAICA ‘Acceptable tax planning’ (2009) available at 
<https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2009/1733_Acceptable_tax_planning htm.>, accessed on 26/08/2017. 
131 Theron (note 32 above) 11. 
132 H Louw ‘Tax Alert’ (14 January 2014) available at 
<https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/news/publications/2014/tax/downloads/Tax-Alert---
17-January-2014.pdf.>, accessed on 26/08/2017. 
133 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302. 
134 Section 80A-L. 
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which was applied in the leading tax avoidance case of Duke of Westminster135. Although this 
case applied the principle in 1936, the changing economy and legal system could possibly have 
changed the way it would apply today.  However, NWK applied the same principles to a recent 
situation, confirming their validity today. Both courts considered the transaction as a whole. It 
is submitted that NWK crystalized the Substance over Form principles which were considered 
in Westminster. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the definition of tax avoidance must be supported by various 
case law which assists the legislation: when transactions should be included within tax 
provisions but are designed by the parties to be excluded, the courts must validate the true 
intention of the transaction. The transaction must express its true nature since that is what the 
court will give effect to.  The general limitation set out by the various case law principles is 
that taxpayers may engage in a bona fide transaction which results in tax avoiding. 
The case law sets more in-depth limitations and restrictions than legislation or tax avoidance’s 
definition: 136 
Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council137 stated that a transaction is false when it is 
intended to fall outside the provisions of the law, but truthfully should be included within those 
provisions.138 Substance instead of form is regarded by the courts and the law.139 
In Zandberg v Van Zyl140 the court validated the true intention of the transaction. Normally 
parties express their rights and obligations agreed to in the contract, but the real intention is 
concealed by disguising the transaction’s form.141 The true nature of a transaction may not be 
concealed by taxpayers, the transactions cannot be given another name or shape to disguise its 
true nature as per Michau v Maize Board. A court will give effect to the true nature of the 
agreement. 
  
The assistance afforded by case law is needed due of the legislation’s vagueness and lack of 
defined principles, creating uncertainty. This assistance is derived from the common law, 
which encompass case law, and supplements the statutory remedy.  
 
 
135 Westminster supra note 51. 
136 Theron (note 32 above) 25. 
137 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipality Council 1920 AD 530. 
138 Dadoo supra note 137. 
139 Dadoo supra note 137. 
140 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302. 




It is submitted that tax avoidance is universal. It was done by the Egyptians, the Lords and 
today by taxpayers who wish to minimise their tax liability.142  
The concept of tax avoidance is very broad, and legislation has failed to limit its scope, thus 
case law has also been utilised to narrow the scope. The end result is that tax avoidance is 
permissible, if what was entered into was a bona fide transaction,143 and that no legislation 
prohibits the transaction,144 and various other limitations set out by a handful of cases.145  
It is submitted that tax avoidance is facilitated by vague tax legislation. Courts turn to 
precedents because the legislation is too uncertain. It was held that plain words of the statute 
must be applied,146 however these often give rise to several ambiguities.   
 
It is submitted that the language impediment is moot. By either strictly defining concepts in a 
narrow sense or seeking guidance from the court in order to widely define terms, taxpayers will 
avoid tax. Admittedly the definitions will create a too narrow and strict approach, which will 
exclude many taxpayers from rightfully making use of the exemptions or deductions available 
to them, whilst a very wide and vague approach opens the flood gates.  
 
Tax avoidance is thus inevitable regardless of the harm it causes, because it is impossible to 
cover every situation comprehensively and accurately. The next chapter will analyse the harm 
caused by tax avoidance to the fiscus by relying on various statistics and journals. This study 
will be amplified by investigating amounts due in past cases and determining the average tax 
which would not have been paid to the fiscus. Unfortunately had the taxpayers in the 
following cases have not been chosen to be audited or assessed by SARS, the money would 







142 JMP Venter et al 2017: 510-511. 
143 Westminster supra note 51 at 520. 
144 Theron (note 32 above) 12. 
145 Such as the cases discussed above limiting the definition of ‘repair’, or Blue Circle Cement Ltd. v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue (39/84) [1984] ZASCA 14 which dealt with the definition of ‘machinery’. 
146 Westminster supra note 51 at 524. 
20 
 
3 CHAPTER 3: WHAT IS THE HARM OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The definition of tax avoidance has been discussed in great depth by various scholars and in 
judgments as described in Chapter 2.147 The harm that tax avoidance might potentially cause 
in South Africa must now be investigated. SARS has published Tax Statistics covering 20 
years’ tax collection. While these statistics reveal the actual amounts collected, they do not 
examine the effects tax avoidance had on these statistics.148 This is an issue that needs to be 
examined. 
As discussed in the introduction, South Africa’s tax revenue funds various ‘government 
programs every year as it is the government’s biggest source of income’149. It was also 
submitted that the vast range of anti-avoidance measures indicate that tax avoidance is not 
welcome, despite being legal.150 This chapter seeks to submit that every opportunity utilised 
by taxpayers to avoid their tax liability results in funds which would have been collected by 
SARS being redirected to the taxpayers and not the fiscus. Despite this being beneficial to tax 
morality, it restricts the aid governmental programs can offer to the poor.  
 
3.2 The Harm of Tax Avoidance 
The interests the fiscus must balance is allowing taxpayers the freedom to manage their affairs 
while simultaneously ensuring that the primary source of tax collection is not threatened. In 
order to investigate the balancing act, the main source of tax collection must be determined:  
‘The total revenue collected by SARS for the fiscal years from 2007/08 to 2016/17 amounted 
to R8.13 trillion‘.151 Tax revenue collected in the 2017 tax year amounted to R1 144.1 billion.152 
‘This tax collection was mainly supported by Personal Income Tax (‘PIT’), which grew by 
R36.6 billion’.153 ‘Revenue from PIT, as a percentage of total tax revenue, increased from 
29.6% in 2007/08 to 37.2% in 2016/17’.154  By contrast in 2016/17 VAT, the next biggest 
 
147 Benn (note 13 above) 8-9. 
148 SARS ‘Tax Statistics’ (2017) available at <http://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/Tax-
Statistics.aspx>, accessed on 03/16/2018. 
149 Kumarasingam ‘Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion Explained’ (2010) available at 
<http://www.sataxguide.co.za/tax-avoidance-and-tax-evasion-explained-and-exemplified/>, accessed on 
28/02/2018. 
150  Act 58/1962: sec80A-L. 
151 SARS (note 148 above).  
152 SARS (note 148 above). 
153 SARS (note 148 above). 
154 SARS (note 148 above). 
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contributor, contributed 25.3%, Other 19.4% and Corporate Income Tax contributing the 
smallest amount of 18.1%.155 
 
It has been stated that ‘tax avoidance is a rich person’s game’.156 ‘Statistics are published by 
National Treasury showing that individuals in the top income bracket account for the lion’s 
share of the PIT collected each year’.157 ‘Despite the evidence stating that the main source of 
tax collection is personal income tax, it is unfortunately based on a taxpayer’s reported taxable 
income rather than their true economic income.’158 It is submitted that these statistics would 
thus not account for the millions lost to tax avoidance. ‘The damage from abusive tax avoidance 
has already been done, prior to the statistics being published’.159 Considering the general 
poverty and skewed wealth distribution in South Africa, it is vital that the nation is provided 
with public goods i.e. education, infrastructure, health and national security.160 However, for 
the government to provide such services, the funding used is found in a skewed tax base. 161 
This results in a cost ineffective exercise, despite the merit of the expenditure. 162  
 
In an attempt to investigate statistics that could display the harm of tax avoidance, the following 
is submitted:  
• In 2005 South Africa had approximately 44 million residents; 163 
• Of these only 3.8 million were registered taxpayers;164 
• Of these only 500 000 admitted to earning annual income exceeding R180 000 in their 
2004 tax returns. 165 
In order to appreciate these statistics, it must first be established how many individuals actually 
earned above the R180 000 threshold. 
 
 
155 SARS (note 148 above). 
156 E Liptak ‘Failure, More Failure and Some Success: GAAR Ten Years On’ (2017) 60 TaxTalk: 59. 
157 SARS (note 148 above). 
158 Liptak (note 156 above) 59. 
159 Liptak (note 156 above) 59. 
160 N.J. Schoeman1 and Y. van Heerden 2009. Finding the Optimum Level of Taxes in South Africa: A Balanced 
Budget Approach 28.  
161 Ibid 160.  
162 Ibid 160.  
163 L Killbourn ‘Tightening the tax-collecting net’ (2005) LexisNexis. 
164 SARS ‘Tax Statistics’ (2008). 




 % of Taxpayers Taxable income Tax liability 
R0 – R80 000 44 % 14 % 5 % 
R80 001 – R130 000 28 % 24 % 16 % 
R130 001 – R180 000 11 % 14 % 13 % 
R180 001 – R230 000 6 % 9 % 10 % 
R230 001 – R300 000 5 % 10 % 12 % 
R300 001 and above 6 % 29 % 44 % 
Source: An Empirical Dissemination of the Personal Income Tax Regime in South Africa Using a 
Microsimulation Tax Model for the year 2004/05166 
 
As the table shows, the largest number of taxpayers fall within the lowest income group of 
earning less than R80 000. A total of 17% of taxpayers earn above R180 000 annually. If 
calculated on the abovementioned 4 million registered taxpayers, it is submitted that 680 000 
individuals actually earned above the R180 000 threshold. Furthermore, this same group pays 
56% of the total tax liability.  
It is submitted that the statistics National Treasury used to determine 2006 Tax Collection was 
incorrect as 180 000 individuals failed to disclose their income or pay tax accordingly. This 
was calculated by considering that only 500 000 registered taxpayers admitted to earning 
annual income exceeding R180 000 in their 2004 tax returns, 167 whilst the Microsimulation 
Tax Model determined that 17% of taxpayers earn above the R180 000 threshold (680 000 
individuals). It is conceded that this failure could be due to tax avoidance or another cause, but 
regardless, the fiscus is still harmed. The governmental programs rely on this skewed 
information to budget for the proceeding years. It is submitted that the projects envisaged by 
these programs could have a far better reach if the actual funds it is entitled to, are declared and 
paid.  
If in 2017, 37.2% of the R1 144.1 billion collected was not based on the taxpayers’ true 
economic income, it means that roughly R425.6 billion was the least amount of income 
generated by the fiscus from PIT and that more is owing to it. As these statistics show, tax 
avoidance will cause revenue loss.168  As previously stated, tax avoidance is a rich man’s game 
and as in 2005, it is submitted that the higher income bracket taxpayers are more likely to avoid 
 
166 N.J. Schoeman1 and Y. van Heerden 2010. An Empirical Dissemination of the Personal Income Tax Regime 
in South Africa Using a Microsimulation Tax Model: 21. 
167 Killbourn (note 163 above). 
168 K Thersby ‘SARS tightens screws on tax-avoidance schemes’ (2005) Tax Breaks 12 1. 
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their tax liability. It is further submitted that because of the tax avoidance, revenue loss must 
be restored and this will be done by taxing other aspects of the economy leading to an unfair 
shift of the tax burden.169 The recent increase in VAT is a good example of this shift of the tax 
burden.170  
Another harm caused by tax avoidance flows from the shift of the tax burden as taxpayer 
compliance is discouraged.171 SARS is of the view that the compliance ethos of the taxpayers 
is lower than expected due to several factors combined (for example South Africa’s economic 
marginalisation). The result is that large parts of the population remain uneducated about tax.172 
An emerging disrespect for the law and the tax system could also be to blame for the lack of 
compliance.173   
By focussing on case law dealing with the crisp issues of tax avoidance, it can be seen that 
when compared to the year the cases were heard, relatively large amounts of money were 
collected due to SARS assessing or auditing taxpayers who attempted to mitigate their tax 
liability:  
Case no 13065/13 concerned ‘the analysis of supply agreements entered into between the 
appellant and some of its foreign subsidiaries’.174 The tax liability included the assessed 
amount, additional tax and interest for the 2005 to 2007 years of assessments, which amounts 
to a total of R 335 253 655.175  
R820 000 was collected in ITC 1611 59 SATC 126, where the taxpayer entered into a scheme 
comprising packages of agreements, which resulted in the acquisition of two stands and then 
the subsequent leasing of the property to a provident fund which owned the taxpayer.  
Secretary For Inland Revenue v Gallagher [1978] 3 All SA 1 (A) held that a subjective test 
must be applied as the ‘purpose which those carrying out the scheme intend to achieve by 
means of the scheme’ is of prime importance versus the objective test which as regard to the 
effect of the scheme. The taxpayer, through the workings of a scheme, donated all his shares 
 
169 Thersby (note 168 above). 
170 SARS ‘SARS Ready to Implement VAT Rate Increase’ (2018) available at 
<https://www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/Pages/27-March-2018---SARS-ready-to-implement-VAT-rate-
increase.aspx>, accessed on 08/04/2019. 
171 Thersby (note 168 above). 
172 SG Nienaber ‘Factors that could influence the ethical behaviour of tax professionals’ (2010) 18(1) Meditari 
Accountancy Research 34. 
173 Thersby (note 168 above). 
174 Case 13065/13. 
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in a company (‘SPH’) to three trusts created for the benefit of his children.176 Thereafter he 
sold all his shares in a public company to the SPH company on loan accounts which remained 
due and payable.177 The Commissioner included the income the SPH company had earned from 
the assets it acquired via loan account, to the taxpayer’s income as follows:178 
 
Year of   Tax avoided   Tax payable   Net 
Assessment   by   by SPH   Loss 
    Respondent        
1969   R6659   R2990   R3669 
1970   5173   2450   2723 
1971   6046   3552   2494 
    R17878   R8992   R8886 
 
Therefore, the entire R17 878 was included as gross income and collected by the fiscus.179  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
All statistics published by SARS merely reveal the actual amounts collected, and do not 
account for tax avoidance or what the true economic income of taxpayers are. It is submitted 
that not only is the fiscus being harmed by avoiding tax liability, but other social initiatives, 
such as assistance to the poor. It is submitted that this could even be said to contradict the 
philosophy of ‘ubuntu’.  
It has been stated that although tax avoidance is legal, the various anti-avoidance measure 
SARS have implemented should be a clear indication that it is being discouraged.  
 
The Legislator has relentlessly changed the law to keep abreast of the development of new tax 
avoidance methods. South Africa’s previous anti-avoidance legislation was based on outdated 
legal form and intent. After SARS challenged a number of aggressive tax avoidance schemes 
in 2005/06, the Commissioner collected a further R1bn.180 It is submitted that this is ample 
evidence of the harm that tax avoidance can cause.  As the case law illustrates, when the fiscus 
do assess taxpayers, large amounts become due and payable to SARS. In addition, based on 
this, it is further submitted that there are vast amounts of money which the fiscus is entitled to, 
but do not receive in the tax collection process. It should be questioned whether this is due to 
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tax avoidance or an ineffective tax collection procedure. The next chapter will investigate at 
what cost the anti-avoidance schemes are implemented and will determine whether this tax 
































4 CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE TAX COLLECTION 
PROCEDURE 
4.1 Introduction  
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) was established as an organ of state within the 
public administration in 1997.181 The institution was established by legislation182 in order to 
fulfil the main objectives of collecting revenue and controlling the manufacture, import, export, 
storage, movement, or use of certain goods.183 According to the South African Revenue Service 
Act these objectives were to be carried out both efficiently and effectively.184 The words 
‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ will be investigated in this chapter. The start and end of the tax 
collection process must also be ascertained. As stated in Chapter 1, SARS must perform its 
functions in a manner that is the most cost-efficient and effective. These functions must also 
be performed whilst keeping the values and principles mentioned in section 195185 of the 
Constitution in mind.186 It is important to note that the Act187 states that SARS ‘may do all that 
is necessary or expedient to perform its functions properly’.188 Despite these objectives, SARS 
allows for some degree of tax avoidance. 
The interests the fiscus must balance is allowing taxpayers the freedom to manage their affairs 
while simultaneously ensuring that the main source of tax collection is not threatened, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.    
 
4.2 Tax Collection 
Before the effectiveness and efficiency of SARS’ tax collection can be investigated, the 
limitations of the concept of tax collection must first be covered. 
Tax collection includes but is not limited to, the registration of persons as taxpayers, ensuring 
the number of tax defaulters whose returns are outstanding decrease, reducing the number of 
unassessed income returns and auditing taxpayers.189 These examples of tax collection will be 
discussed below with reference made to 1997 statistics and goals set when SARS was 
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transforming itself, as well as comparing same with the statistics of 2017/2018 for 
accountability. 
 
4.2.1 Tax registration:  
SARS has been actively campaigning to identify and register tax evaders since 1997. This is 
described as ‘broadening the tax base’. In 1998 a total of 3 671 129 taxpayers were 
registered.190 At the end of 2018 the total of taxpayers registered amounted to 4 895 565.191 
The mere 1.2 million taxpayers registered within the last 10 years seems inadequate. However, 
in 1998 the Advisory Board were of the opinion that by broadening the tax base and eventually 
lightening the load on these taxpayers, it would contribute to the compliance of the 
taxpayers.192 Despite these ambitious goals set when SARS was transforming 1997, in 2018 
‘13% of the South African population of 56 million people were the persons paying income 
tax’.193  Regardless of the aim of lightening the load on the taxpayers, the approximate 1% of 
the taxpayers (these are the 480 000 persons who earned more than R750 000 per annum) are 
responsible for 61% of the total tax bill, which is a significant burden on a small portion of the 
population.194  
 
4.2.2 Outstanding income returns and assessments issue: 
In 1997 2 676 516 cases were open for outstanding tax returns (PAYE, VAT and IT). It was 
reported that a year later the number had declined to 235 721.195 In 2018 SARS ‘embarked on 
a hunt with the National Prosecuting Authority to prosecute non-compliant taxpayers, this 
included taxpayers who failed to submit tax returns’.196 The intensification of SARS’ 
Outstanding Return Project is due to the increase in non-submission of returns (PAYE, VAT, 
CIT and PIT). Ten cases were finalised and taxpayers sentenced and fined, whilst approximate 
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49 cases are still pending.197 ‘There is approximately 30 million returns outstanding, in many 
cases multiple returns due by a single taxpayer’.198 When comparing the 30 million with the 
past two decade’s 235 721 outstanding returns, and considering that there is an additional 1.2 
million registered taxpayers, it is incomprehensible that the tax collections had become so 
inefficient or mismanaged.        
 
4.2.3 Tax Debtors: 
In 1997 over R12 billion was due and payable to SARS which seems irrelevant,199 when 
compared to the R143 billion book debt SARS had due to it in 2018.200 SARS maintains that 
there is a reduction in the amount of the older debts but decreasing the backlogs of unassessed 
cases, increased successes with audits and assessments and additional taxpayers registering has 
resulted in new debts increasing.201 Apparently, this can already be seen by the exceeded new 
debt of 1998 amounting to 259% more than in 1997.202  
 
Despite the annual tax collection strategies ranging from 1997 to 2018, SARS has consistently 
experienced a decrease in tax collection and fallen short of the budget target for the last five 
years. For the 2018/2019 fiscal year, SARS collected R14.6 billion less than estimated or 
budgeted R1.302 trillion.203 It is conceded that it still represents a growth of 5.8% from the 
previous fiscal year. When investigating these amounts, the refunds paid out to taxpayers must 
be considered. SARS thus overall collected a gross amount of R1 575 trillion, higher refunds 
might have lowered the net tax collection for the fiscal year, but SARS maintains that money 
was put back in the economy. 204 
 
197 SARS (note 191 above). 
198 SARS (note 191 above). 
199 Mitchell (note 189 above). 
200 I Lamprecht ‘SARS may not be able to collect 40% of its R143bn debt book’ (2018) available at 
<https://www moneyweb.co.za/mymoney/moneyweb-tax/sars-may-not-be-able-to-collect-40-of-its-r143-billion-
debt-book/>, accessed on 08/04/2019. 
201 Mitchell (note 189 above). 
202 Mitchell (note 189 above). 
203 S Menon ‘SARS undershoots revenue target, again’ (2019) available at 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-04-01-sars-undershoots-revenue-target-again/>, accessed on 
08/14/2019. 
204 National Treasury ‘Budge Speech 2019’ (20 February 2019) available at 
<https://www.gov.za/speeches/budget_vote>, accessed on 08/04/2019. 
29 
 
During the budget review, Treasury said that economic weakness reduced PIT and CIT, but 
administrative weakness in collection was a contributing factor.205 Despite the demotivating 
figures from the previous years, SARS set a 2019/2020 budget target of R1 422 trillion.206   
 
4.3 ‘Efficient’ and ‘Effective’ 
The words ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ are used in the legislation governing SARS, without a 
definition provided. This chapter will investigate the prescribed manner in which SARS must 
fulfil its objections, before a balance can be found between tax avoidance and tax collection. 
‘Efficient’ in its ordinary meaning is ‘productive of desired effects; capable of producing 
desired results with little or no waste (as of time or materials)’. 207 ‘Effective’ in its ordinary 
meaning is ‘producing a desired effect, capable of bringing about an effect’.208 
Tax avoidance is based on uncertainties created by tax legislation and its ever-changing nature, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. SARS also relies on changing legislation in order to combat the loss 
of revenue. It is submitted that the changes to legislation need to be ‘both capable of producing 
desired results with no waste of resources as well as capable of bringing about an actual 
effect’.209    
Unfortunately, as stated by Lord Normand in Vestey’s Executors v IRC:210 
 
 Parliament in its attempt to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance may fall 
short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for the taxpayers who do not try to avoid their share 
of the burden, and it is disappointing to the Inland Revenue. But the Court will not stretch the 
terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the efforts of Parliament and to stop gaps which 
are left open by the statutes. 
 
If the terms of taxing Acts will not be stretched to cover the gaps left open by statutes, the 
question is whether SARS should spend resources on anti-avoidance measures or just make all 
tax avoidance schemes impermissible. The cost of collection of tax must be reasonable in 
relation to its revenue productivity, in order to maintain efficient i.e. produce the desired effect 
with little waste.211 In a general tax reform process, the cost of tax administration is an 
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important consideration. It is stated that ‘a given fiscal authority should employ only those 
taxes it can best manage and no others.’212 Unfortunately the past has shown that the country 
could not succeed with implementing new legislation to reduce avoidance. In the early 1980’s, 
South Africa had a prevalent feeling that the taxing system was unfair and inefficient. The 
taxpayers felt that the system was too complicated. This resulted in deterioration in the public 
attitude towards tax morality.213 It is further submitted that tax collection cannot be discussed 
without referring to tax morality. There is clearly a direct correlation between the sharp decline 
in SARS’ effectiveness and the decline in tax morality. An editorial in the Business Day even 
goes as far as stating that ‘tax morality is surely an issue, and who can blame taxpayers for 
avoiding tax any way they can, given the scandalous conduct of the tax authority itself in recent 
years, not to mention the capture of the state itself?’.214 
Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service and Another215 dealt 
specifically with tax morality. Legislation at that time gave SARS the power to ensure payment 
from a taxpayer without reference to a court of law216 as set out by Judge Kriegler as follows:217 
…case concerns the constitutional validity of section 36(1) and subsections (2)(a) and (5) of 
section 40 of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the Act). The question is whether these 
provisions unjustifiably limit the right of access to courts protected by section 34 of the 
Constitution. 
 The only option available to the Applicant was to pay the amount due prior to the dispute being 
settled by courts.218 When considering that SARS had completely disallowed his input-VAT 
of R77 667 722.27 and were claiming a total amount of R265 934 943.04, which included 
penalties, interest and additional tax, this predicament was extremely prejudicial towards the 
Applicant.219 
SARS attempted to justify the limitation by arguing that the State has the capacity to impose 
and collect revenue in an efficient system. Apparently, these provisions of the legislation 
ensured an efficient system of taxation as it discourage dishonest and careless returns. SARS 
maintained that due to South Africa having such a small tax base, it was important that those 
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who were mandated to pay tax, do so.220   
The High Court held that the denial of recourse destroys the ability to do ‘effective budgetary 
and macro-economic planning’, and would simply further erode an already poor tax 
morality.221 This in turn would deprive the fiscus of considerable amounts and damage our 
economy.222 The sections were declared to be in breach of the Constitution. 223     
 
The fiscus must simultaneously balance tax collection and avoidance on the one hand, and tax 
collection and morality on the other hand. 
 
SARS has been attempting to transform since Administrative Autonomy was achieved on 1 
October 1997:224  
It reports that the process of transformation, which includes drafting a strategic business plan, 
approving transformation processes and staffing a transformation unit, means a more efficient 
and service orientated organisation with better tax collection.225 It is worrisome that despite 20 
years passing, SARS still has not reached their goal. It is important to note that whilst the state 
of the economy might play a role in tax collection, administrative efficiency drives the 
collection process. SARS address its efficiency in that it wishes to have little waste, but not its 
effectiveness. If SARS had not reached its budget for the last 5 years226, it is submitted that it 
has not been effective as it has not produced the desired result of collecting revenue to the 
fullest of its ability. 
   
In 2001 SARS reduced the extension periods for submission of income tax returns, this was 
done to ensure more effective tax collection.227 SARS is commended for taking this hands-on 
administrative step in improving tax collection. It is submitted that administrative action, and 
not two-decade old transformation speeches, is what is required to be more efficient and 
effective. An example of excellent administrative action by the Legislature, enabling SARS 
more effective and efficient tax collection, is the introduction of the Tax Administration Act 
(‘the TAA’).  Prior to the enactment of this Act, each tax Act was governed by its own 
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administrative provisions. When aligning the administration of the tax Acts in the TAA to a 
possible practical extent (for example prescribing obligations and rights to taxpayers, or 
prescribing duties and powers of persons involved), certainty is created. It is submitted that this 
certainty also boosts tax morality.  
In 2016 Minister of Finance, Mr Gordhan, praised SARS for improving the tax collection 
processes.228 The new operating model SARS had implemented was the cause of success and 
promised that it was a key role player for SARS to achieve its R1 trillion budget target at the 
time. This model also re-aligned the organisation: Customs and Excise was made a branch on 
its own; branches now dealt with business and individual taxes and SARS implemented a 
human resource unit. Administrative action led to SARS’ increase in efficient and effective tax 
collection.  
 
4.2 Conclusion  
As previously stated, administrative effectiveness and efficiency is what is required to improve 
tax collection. Various authors have different opinions as to how to give effect to this. Daniel 
Erasmus voiced his opinion in the Cape Times,229 according to his experience as a specialist in 
income tax, the problem in South Africa is that the tax base is too small and carried by a small 
part of the economically active population. Should this base not be broadened, he is of the 
belief that ‘getting the golden goose to keep on laying more eggs would lower tax morality as 
people would tire of continuing to fork out for few perceived benefits’. His recommendation is 
partly supported: simplify the Income Tax Act and conduct mass education programmes about 
the benefits of paying tax as a means to broadening the tax base.   
Should the Income Tax Act or any other tax Act be simplified, the language used could create 
more loopholes enabling tax avoidance as discussed in Chapter 2. It is submitted that mass 
education programmes are an excellent way of effectively and efficiently collecting tax. Studies 
have been done as to the success of including tax education in secondary school syllabus as the 
present’s scholars will be the future’s taxpayers.230   
 
In the 2018 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance stressed that tax morality is a crucial 
component of a healthy democracy. Further steps SARS has undertaken to do to improve the 
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administrative efficiency is to give effect to some of the Davis Tax Committee’s 
recommendations, which included those on the accountability of SARS to the Minister of 
Finance and strengthening the office of the Tax Ombud.231  
It is interesting to note that a year later, in the 2019 Budget Speech it was conceded that:232  
 
…problems with tax administration, as highlighted in the findings of the SARS Commission, 
partly explain poor revenue-collection performance. Improving collections hinges on restoring 
the efficiency of SARS. In the short term, such improvements may be more effective in raising 
revenue than further substantial tax increase.  
 
It is submitted that when comparing ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ there will be some overlapping 
territory.233 Whilst ‘efficient’ could be applied to both things and people, it is commonly used 
when referring to organizations such as SARS, systems or machines. The focus of this word is 
on how little is lost or wasted, while producing the desired results. ‘Efficient’ would be used 
to describe things that work as it intended to, such as SARS policies and techniques. This word 
could also be used to describe people who accomplish what they set out to do. 
SARS have been attempting to be efficient for decades now, it is encouraging to see specific 
action plans put in place over the years such as specifically giving effect to recommendations, 
educating taxpayers at workshops and the implementation of the TAA, instead of a mere 
‘transformation plan’. Whether the changes are effective and produces a desired effect, is 
another matter. However, the final realisation in the 2019 Budget Speech that the improvement 
of the efficiency of SARS will produce greater results in tax collection that the increase of 
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5 CHAPTER 5: THE BALANCE BETWEEN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT TAX 
COLLECTION AND PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE TAX AVOIDANCE 
5.1 Introduction  
When balancing tax collection with tax avoidance, tax morality has to be considered. It has 
been submitted in the previous chapter that administrative effectiveness and efficiency is the 
best solution for optimal tax collection. Tax collection starts with registration of a taxpayer and 
concludes with assessing or auditing the taxpayer and physically collecting the funds. In this 
extreme balancing act, it has been said that the answer to the research question may lie in the 
distinction between permissible and impermissible tax avoidance. SARS has penalised 
impermissible tax avoidance whilst admitting that is tax avoidance is not illegal. This chapter 
will discuss impermissible and permissible tax avoidance, as this could possibly be where the 
balance lies, for which this study is searching.  
 
5.2 Impermissible tax avoidance  
Impermissible tax avoidance is defined in section 80A234 as follows: 
‘An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if its sole or main 
purpose was to obtain a tax benefit…’ 
The section adds more requirements: ‘should the arrangement be made for a mere tax benefit 
and, in the context of a business, either the manner it was done by would not normally bona 
fide be for business purposes or it lacks commercial substance, the arrangement is 
impermissible’.235 Should it be made, other than in a business context, and the manner of 
arrangement would not normally be used as a bona fide purpose other than for the tax benefit, 
the arrangement would also be classified as impermissible.236  It is submitted that the first two 
subsections of section 80A is rather narrow with specific contexts in mind. However, 
subsection (c) provides for an arrangement in any context whereby rights or obligations are 
created that ‘would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length’237, 
alternatively ‘would result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of this 
Act’238. These provisions are extremely wide and encompassing. When SARS and National 
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Treasury had hearings on the Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance in March 2006, various 
taxpayer representatives criticised the implementation of the legislation. It was submitted by 
the Law Society of South Africa that impermissible tax avoidance was an ill-defined foreign 
concept that SARS had imported. SARS justified their position by referring to the changed 
environment which included financial deregulation, globalisation and sophisticated 
information technology. SARS further maintains that from a global experience, impermissible 
tax avoidance causes varied and pervasive harm.239 International commerce is an integral and 
essential part of the modern world we inhabit.240 There is also a global shift towards more 
compliance and transparency regarding tax avoidance.241  Anti-avoidance measures are given 
more attention globally.242 Tightening the tax net has led to more imaginative tax avoidance 
schemes when considering such in the context of globalisation.243 The shortcomings include 
that anti-avoidance measures are complex and an administration burden. Given globalisation 
of economies, it is important that legal trends remain similar. Aside from the inequalities, 
increased tax burdens, disrespect and misallocated resources, when governments accommodate 
the structures that facilitate this avoidance, it could also be used to conceal unlawfully obtained 
money.244 Tax avoidance challenges the apparent social fairness as well as shifts funds from 
the public purse.245   
Emphasis was placed on the commercial substance needed for transactions not to qualify as 
impermissible arrangements. It is submitted that the legislation, to an extent, codified the 
common law Substance over Form principle discussed at great lengths in this study.  
Ineffective tax collection and difficult legislation pre-1994 have allowed South Africa’s 
taxpayers to avert large amounts of revenue that should be subject to income tax in South Africa 
to ‘off-shore’ tax shelters and tax havens.246 This amounts to tax avoidance.  Historically, 
however, SARS was not ‘adequately equipped to deal with certain of these transactions, and 
remained frustrated and relatively powerless in this respect ‘.247 If this damaging practice is 
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legal, the ethics of it must be questioned if it leads to such a growing inequality.248 By focussing 
on the harm it causes to society, instead of its legal definition, it is easy to both find faults with 
the practice and question how much of the much-needed resources are misallocated.249 There 
is an inappropriate transfer of funds away from the public purse.250  Unfortunately this will 
probably not be rectified as tax avoidance also weakens Parliament and Treasury’s ability to 
make and implement better economic policies.251  
As mentioned previously, there are specific statutory anti-avoidance measures as well as 
common law anti-avoidance provisions i.e. Substance over Form or GAAR. The common law 
provisions will be discussed next. However, cognisance must be taken of the various statutory 
measures put in place throughout the legislation, such as Section 45(5)252 which in essence 
provides specific consequences should the intra-group transaction be used within 18 months of 
a previous transaction. The Legislature envisaged impermissible tax avoidance schemes and 
therefore inserted the anti-avoidance provision. When considering the Income Tax Act253 there 
are various sections with subsections inserted as an anti-avoidance measure.  
 
5.3 GAARs  
General anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) are believed to be SARS’ most efficient and effective 
methods to curtail the harm of tax avoidance and impermissible tax avoidance itself. Thus, it 
plays a critical role in any tax system. The GAARs can only curtail impermissible tax avoidance 
as the legislation stands. The avoidance information supplied to taxpayers by the GAARs is 
another important function. GAARs are effective in that they are able to bring about an effect 
by also informing taxpayers where the line between permissible and impermissible avoidance 
lies.254 It determines to what extent taxpayers are allowed to avoid tax. It has a complex dual 
function of simultaneously targeting impermissible avoidance and honouring permissible 
avoidance, regardless of how fine that line is. From the above, it is clear that it is imperative 
that the GAARs must be effective in fulfilling these roles.  
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As effective as GAARs are, a study, covering from the historical to the current experiences 
GAARs have had in selected countries, has found that they lack efficiency.255 Supporting the 
claims that tax avoidance is a global problem, it was found that all the countries’ anti-avoidance 
rules had similarities. Conceding the fundamental differences based on the different economic 
stances of the countries, they all have identifiable common factors that work against the 
GAARs’ efficiency.256 Aggressive taxpayers, the judiciary’s role, GAARs inherent weakness 
and the various indicators of impermissible tax avoidance all form part of these common 
factors.257 As per Vestey’s Executors, mentioned above, the limitations of the law in how far it 
can be stretched as a defence against tax avoidance, is another crippling factor against the 
efficiency of GAARs.258 The study merely concluded that the factors need to be acknowledged 
and addressed first, before more efficient GAARs can be created.259                                       
Many of these factors would be invalidated if a precise definition for ‘impermissible tax 
avoidance’ could be given.260 With taxpayers having a right to arrange their affairs and GAARs 
performing a dual function of informing taxpayers of the extent of this right, the GAARs role 
is complicated; the lack of precise definition for ‘impermissible tax avoidance’ being the 
cause.261 As discussed in Chapter 2, this solution will not necessarily be successful as defined 
principles leave room for taxpayers to manipulate their affairs so as to fall out of the definition. 
SARS approaches this situation acknowledging the importance of predictability and certainty 
in a tax system but states that these values are not absolute. SARS recognises that a GAAR will 
not be able to be overly precise in order to be effective.262  
The opposite can be used against this argument. If taxpayers avoid falling within the realms of 
the GAAR, their tax burden will be reduced. There is ample time for taxpayers to study and 
scrutinize GAARs in order to find ways to avoid the restrictions. These stay unchanged as they 
are not made annually. Examples of this practice includes exploiting the business-purpose 
doctrine available in the United States.263 Taxpayers claim transactions made inherently with 
tax motivations, are made with a business purpose in order to comply. In South Africa, section 
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103(1) was exploited by easily passing the abnormality test as transactions merely needed to 
be common or normal. 264 
This tug of war between taxpayers and their tax advisors versus SARS and government is what 
creates tax avoidance. It seems that, broken down to the elementary principles and excluding 
state corruption, the one force creates and enforces tax legislation whilst the other attempts to 
circumvent that same legislation.  The limitation of this right to circumvent tax laws has often 
resulted in judicial activism, with courts defending the right by interpreting the rules 
restrictively to limit the uncertainty.265 
Despite these circumstances, GAARs still need to be efficient and effective. The near-moot 
situation is believed to be solved by legal means as impermissible tax avoidance is virtuously 
a legal problem.266 It is submitted that tax avoidance is not a simple problem and requires an 
extremely complex solution. To be effective and efficient, a holistic approach must address the 
root causes of tax avoidance. Impermissible tax avoidance is a universal problem, not an 
alleged legal problem.267 Unfortunately GAARs are an attempted legal reaction to the universal 
problem.268 This is where the rules lack efficiency: legal resources are wasted on a universal 
problem without addressing the root causes of tax avoidance. 269 
In spite of the waste of legal resources, the fiscus still owes the general body of taxpayers a 
legal duty to act fairly when dealing with the discretionary powers. 270 This can be done by 
efficient and economic use of resources, maintaining and promoting professional ethics, 
responding to taxpayers’ needs in an unbiased manner with a service that is impartial and fair. 
271 Lastly, the public must be provided with accurate, accessible and timely information. This 
legal duty is also subject to the requirements of respectable management. 272  
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265 Australia and Canada’s case law has reference: FCT v Peabody (1994 181 CLR 359) held that a single step 
within a large arrangement should not be isolated if doing so robs the step of practical meaning.  In Copthorne 
Holdings Ltd v The Queen (2011 SCC 63), it was held that when dealing with a sub-arrangement, ‘it must be 
viewed in the context of the series to enable the court to determine whether abusive tax avoidance has occurred. 
In such a case, whether a transaction is abusive will only become apparent when it is considered in the context 
of the series of which it is part and the overall result that is achieved.’. 
266 Ibid 29. 
267 Ibid 30. 
268 Ibid 30. 
269 Ibid 30. 
270 J Silke ‘Taxpayers and the Constitution: A Battle Already Lost’ 282 Acta Juridica (2002) 309. 
271 Ibid 31. 




SARS’s efficiency and effectiveness were discussed and criticised in the previous chapter 
whilst this chapter placed more focus on impermissible and permissible tax avoidance and the 
GAAR’s efficiency.  
Although GAARs are seen to be effective, their efficiency is limited. The factors limiting this 
efficacy are interconnected in certain aspects, regardless of the country. It is also these factors 
that need to be identified and overcome to create greater GAARs.273 It is submitted that certain 
factors will never be overcome. The lack of an exact description of impermissible tax avoidance 
is an example. SARS believes that less aggressive GAARs can still be created while using the 
limited uncertainty. Judicial interpretation remains the greatest threat to an efficient GAAR, as 
well as not acknowledging other measures not relating to law, that could address the universal 
cause of impermissible tax avoidance.274 
 
Tax avoidance could simply be made illegal if Parliament legislated it, but this would result in 
very complex legislation, and an increase in complex tax legislation will simultaneously 
increase the compliance burden on all, including the lower income brackets.275 In a country 
already struggling with compliance issues, this would be counter-productive.   
 
Broadening the tax base was previously submitted as a solution to improved tax collection, 
however due to South Africa’s small tax base, this stance has been criticised as being too 
burdensome on the tax morality of the taxpayers that do pay tax. This study does not believe 
this to be the solution. In order to manage the balancing act, SARS would have to 
administratively improve their efficiency. It is further submitted that by restricting the wasted 
costs determining impermissible tax avoidance and rather educating the taxpayers as to how 
the taxation system works, including what permissible tax avoidance entails, tax morality will 
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6 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This study focussed on efficiency, effectiveness and certainty. SARS has routinely maintained 
that in order to collect taxes, the tax base must be broadened. This study also focussed on tax 
avoidance, which the small tax base use to reduce their legal obligations to pay tax.  
As stated in Chapter 1, the problem the fiscus faces is that it must balance allowing taxpayers 
the freedom to manage their affairs while simultaneously ensuring that the main source of tax 
collection is not threatened. This study aimed to evaluate whether this balance was possible. 
 
Tax avoidance considers two legal principles that were discussed in Chapter 2. IRC v Duke of 
Westminster set the precedent, which was also relied on in CIR v Estate Kohler & others. 
It was held that ‘taxpayers are permitted to legally arrange their affairs so as to remain outside 
the provisions of a particular statute’.276 The same principle was investigated in the NWK case, 
where the court emphasized that ‘the law will not be deceived by the by the form of a 
transaction and will rend aside the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and examined its 
true nature and substance’.277 Various other cases have been discussed which relied on these 
principles proving the substance over form principle to be universal and still applicable. When 
the courts have to hand down an order as to whether the taxpayer successfully avoided the 
ambit of the legislation by arranging his affairs, they look at the substance (as opposed to the 
form) of a transaction.  
 
It was submitted that if SARS and the Legislature continued to develop more anti-avoidance 
measures, more revenue might be collected. However, it is concluded that this will not be 
effective or efficient use of SARS’ resources as impermissible tax avoidance is a universal 
problem, to which there is no simple solution. It is submitted that limiting tax avoidance more 
than what it already is, does not find application in the balancing act required from SARS. 
SARS could apply the resources to administrative actions which will render them far greater 
returns regarding tax collection.  
 
Thus, the outcome the study concludes upon is that tax avoidance could be balanced within the 
realms of efficient and effective tax collection by improving tax compliance or the tax 
collection process. It is submitted that were the tax collection process be improved, tax 
 
276 R Koster & Son v CIR 1985 (2) SA 831 (A), 47 SATC 23. 
277 NWK supra note 37. 
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compliance and tax morality will improve too. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 takes the 
argument a step further by discussing patriotic duty. As discussed in the study, tax morality 
must be considered. The case held that taxpayers may arrange their affairs, as taxpayers are not 
bound to arrangements that will collect the most revenue for treasury. There is no moral duty 
on any taxpayer to pay tax nor a public duty to pay more than what the law requires.  
 
The harm of tax avoidance was investigated in Chapter 3. Tax avoidance does cause harm to 
the fiscus, but it was found that there is also a probability that many taxpayers did not do their 
returns or were not registered. These issues can be classified as SARS’ administrative problems 
and will fall squarely in the ambit of efficient and effective tax collection should it be rectified. 
As auditing and assessing taxpayers also fall within the ambit of tax collection, the amounts 
collected by SARS by taxpayers who attempted to mitigate their tax liabilities, is an 
administrative action, rather than fighting tax avoidance.  
It is submitted that the harm of inefficient tax collection far outweighs the harm of tax 
avoidance, as inefficient tax collection could be rectified at a smaller cost than more anti-
avoidance measures would cost. 
 
The study focussed on uncertainties. It concluded in Chapter 4 that a big part of GAAR’s 
inefficiency is the lack of impermissible tax avoidance’s definition. The lack of defined terms 
throughout that tax Acts also contribute to the uncertainty of tax avoidance. It was held prior 
in the study that the language argument is moot. However, as held by Wallis JA in CSARS v 
Bosch: ‘If the revenue authorities regard any particular form of tax avoidance as undesirable 
they are free to amend the Act, as occurs annually, to close anything they regard as a loophole. 
That is what occurred when s 8C was introduced.’278 The advised action is limited, as GAAR 
not only causes uncertainty for the taxpayers, but for SARS as well. SARS may challenge 
avoidance arrangements that it cannot, or honour arrangements that it should challenge. Should 
SARS only employ the taxes it can best manage and no others, SARS will clearly focus on 
efficient tax collection, instead of spending resources on anti-avoidance measures and 
amending the legislation annually which contributes to uncertainties. 
 
The study wholly agrees with philosopher Annie Besant: ‘A people can prosper under a very 
 
278CSARS v Bosch [2014] ZASCA 171 (19 November 2014). 
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bad government and suffer under a very good one, if in the first case the local administration 
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